



*Working Group on
Peace and Development*

REPORT

FriEnt-Workshop

A New Deal for Fragile States International Engagement after Busan

19 January 2012

Venue: Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Ludwigkirchplatz 3-4 | 10719 Berlin

FriEnt

FriEnt is a Working Group of: Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) | Church Development Service (EED) | Civil Peace Service Group | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH | Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) | Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) | Heinrich Böll Foundation (hbs) | Misereor/Catholic Central Agency for Development Aid | Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management/Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)

FriEnt aims to pool capacities, support networking and cooperation, and contribute to conflict-sensitive development cooperation. FriEnt's members are committed to working together to promote a range of approaches and highlight the potential of development-oriented peace work to policy-makers and the public at large.

FriEnt's members are united by their great commitment to peace and development. They vary, however, in their size, mandate, international partners, projects and approaches. They aim to utilise their diverse perspectives and experience as an asset for their shared productive work on peace building in the context of development cooperation.

Imprint

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1. INTRODUCTION

On 19 January 2012, the Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt) organised an international workshop on “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. International Engagement after Busan”. The FriEnt Workshop aimed to assess the outcome of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, in December 2011 with respect to the issues of conflict and fragility. Marc Baxmann (FriEnt) opened the workshop with a brief overview of the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” and its origins. The New Deal was endorsed by a number of countries and international organisations at the 4th High Level Forum. The participants in Busan reviewed progress in implementing the five Paris Agenda principles for aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results-based approaches and mutual accountability. It is widely recognised that it is difficult to adapt this agenda to the particular challenges of a weak state. In these contexts, some of the assumptions underlying the Paris Declaration – such as the existence of a clearly articulated and, broadly speaking, nationally owned development strategy or sufficient government capacities – do not hold. Moreover, these principles can – under certain circumstances – also do harm, e.g. by legitimating authoritarian governments.

Therefore, a different approach was needed and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) introduced 10 *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* in 2007. As the Fragile States Survey 2011 *Can’t We Do Better?* showed, however, implementation of these principles is seriously off-track.

Addressing these particular challenges, OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and the g7+ group of fragile states established the *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (IDPS) in Accra in 2008, which developed the Dili Declaration, the Monrovia Roadmap and the New Deal between Accra and Busan. The New Deal sets out five goals to clarify the priorities in fragile states:

- Legitimate politics – Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;
- Security – Establish and strengthen people’s security;
- Justice – Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice;
- Economic foundations – Generate employment and improve livelihoods;
- Revenues and services – Manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social service delivery.

The New Deal also defines principles for cooperation, pathways out of fragility and mutual commitments for results aiming for greater convergence of efforts, greater trust among the various actors, and stronger national ownership.

But what is new in the “New Deal”? How should its commitments be implemented? What are its relevance and implications for governmental and civil society organisations in Europe? In order to address these questions, the first part of the FriEnt workshop took a closer look at the New Deal and its ramifications. The second part of the workshop went further and considered the other challenges arising in the implementation of the New Deal on the global and local levels.

Links & Literature

[A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States](#)

2. PART I: DEBRIEFING ON THE BUSAN SUMMIT

2.1 A New Deal for Aid Effectiveness, Conflict and Fragility?

Topics, Elaborations and Conclusions of Busan

Presentation by Fernanda Faria, ECDPM

Fernanda Faria emphasised in her presentation that the New Deal clearly puts peacebuilding and statebuilding at the centre of international engagement and the aid effectiveness agenda. The New Deal also implies longer-term commitment by focusing on the “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals”, puts fragile states in the lead in terms of monitoring their own fragility (which is not uncontroversial), commits participating actors to mutual trust and transparency, and strives for effective ownership and alignment. Furthermore, the New Deal provides a greater opportunity to incorporate emerging players who have been excluded from OECD/DAC processes, as well as offering potential for reducing the workload and improving coordination.

While ownership, human security, and revenue-raising were being prioritised, insufficient attention was being paid to the decentralised level of local administration where aid could be administered through NGOs directly. Where ownership and donor alignment practices are poor, there is a need to look more closely at local contexts and actors beyond the state and to redefine what is meant by including local actors. This would enable the statebuilding debate to move away from its focus on formal state institutions and become a more inclusive process.

It must be noted, though, that the 19 members of the g7+ have not been equally committed to the New Deal; indeed, even within individual governments, the commitment has varied due to potential disparities between ministries or regions. This dynamic presents the donor community with considerable challenges in accepting the consequences of local ownership and deciding whom to work with. Importantly, it should not be forgotten that the discussions on ownership and statebuilding processes at the local level constitute negotiated political processes that will not necessarily correspond with the donor community’s preferences or interests.

While the g7+ has demonstrated its will to play a part in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and the group may also exert peer pressure on its members, the inherent tensions of international engagement in fragile states will not easily disappear. These tensions are most often caused by a lack of understanding of internal power-political dynamics coupled with a reluctance to take sides in what are, fundamentally, political processes. One response to this dilemma should be to better assess the political economy of fragile states and determine a level of risk acceptance, which raises the contested issue of measuring fragility. Faria expected a necessary but difficult debate to evolve around the issue of global indicators as compared with context-specific indicators. Since the New Deal has the potential to achieve major improvements in relation to transparency, accountability and legitimacy, external donors should definitely incorporate these aspects into their policies and work to strengthen civil society actors who could potentially take on a watchdog function.

Links & Literature

[Presentation by Fernanda Faria, ECDPM](#)

2.2 The “New Deal” from a Civil Society Perspective

Presentation by Koenraad van Brabant, Interpeace

Koenraad van Brabant provided an assessment of the New Deal and a forecast of what was to come after the Busan Summit. The IDPS brought the issues of conflict and fragility into the mainstream development debate and emphasised the quality of state-society relations. Nonetheless, the IDPS focused more on aid and aid flows than on peacebuilding and statebuilding and it thus became a quasi-framework for negotiation between the g7+ and the donor community. The main outcome of the IDPS was a policy product, namely the New Deal, in which national governments, international actors, and civil society were named as the main relevant actors for international engagement in fragile states. The way in which the New Deal document dealt with these three groups of actors, however, did not necessarily correspond to reality:

- First, the New Deal has created the impression that national governments are all benign, which is not always the case in situations of fragility. Nonetheless, diplomacy must be applied in order to maintain relations even in cases where national governments seem to be the biggest impediment to successful stabilisation.
- Second, international actors still have many well-known problems such as high transaction costs, waste, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and special interests, not to mention adherence to the principle of do no harm through negligence, if nothing else.
- Third, civil society is also portrayed as being benign despite significant problems such as competition among NGOs, briefcase NGOs, and the like.

Because of these shortcomings, the New Deal fails to generate a genuine debate about peacebuilding and statebuilding. Furthermore, while the New Deal addresses pathways out of fragility, not much work has been done on the descent into fragility, state collapse, and violence. The impression given by the New Deal is that the nature of fragility is comparable across different fragile states, which belies the fact that different fragile situations call for different pathways out of fragility. The g7+ focused the debate on financial aspects of cooperation to a large extent by demanding compensation for being willing to be characterised as “fragile.”

Many debates on development cooperation centre on efficiency (in the face of waste, duplication, etc.), but greater efficiency does not necessarily lead to greater aid effectiveness. It is also important to look not only at the New Deal but also at the g7+ Statements, which articulate the commitment of national governments to their respective populations.

Van Brabant highlighted the future of the international dialogue and developments in seven pilot countries (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor Leste) as the two major areas of activity after the Busan Summit. In particular, there should be strong learning feedback from individual country experiences, which would ideally inform the IDPS discussion so that it moves beyond aid and

Links & Literature

[Policy Brief 7 - What the Dialogue Has Not Talked About](#)

Koenraad van Brabant | Interpeace | 2012

[Policy Brief 6 - The IDPS Declarations and the Busan Outcome Document](#)

Koenraad van Brabant | Interpeace | 2011

[Homepage of Interpeace with civil society input papers and further policy briefings on the IDPS](#)

aid flows and becomes a platform for real discussion about peacebuilding and statebuilding with a broader scope focused not only on policy debate, but also on the exchange of lessons learned. The question who would be a delegated participant in the IDPS would also be of significance, considering that finance ministers have traditionally represented host countries although the issue areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding are not covered by the competencies of financial ministries. With this in mind, the capacities of state and civil society actors should be strengthened. This should be done in consideration of local contexts and the principles of do no harm, especially because host governments often view civil society actors as competitors for scarce resources.

With respect to progress indicators, the New Deal looks only at the technical side of addressing fragility, a point on which there will inevitably be differing views within a country. Significantly, the question of progress and its indicators is always a political issue as well – incumbents may claim to have made progress in certain sectors so as to reap financial benefits while opposition groups may make accusations of stagnation or regression in the hope of gaining political clout. The discussion of such issues is likely to become more antagonistic in the future. Ultimately, there should be no talk of “implementing” the New Deal, but rather of “testing” it in the pilot countries.

Discussion

Participants noted that the debate on conflict and fragility was merging with the development discussion and advocated improving the dialogue between NGOs that deal with development and those that focus on conflict and fragility issues. Dayna Brown, who attended the Busan Summit in December 2011, highlighted the success of involving civil society in the discussion and pointed out that although the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation turned out to be rather vague, the New Deal did designate seven specific pilot countries.

Overall, the discussion revolved mainly around the subject of testing the New Deal in pilot countries, indicators, potential risks in implementation, and the role of civil society in peacebuilding and statebuilding. While some participants emphasised the benefits of linking peacebuilding and statebuilding, others warned that this approach was problematic in some countries, such as Sri Lanka and Colombia. There was a broad consensus that the New Deal puts fragile states in the lead and that civil society and local authorities in host countries would have a greater opportunity to get involved, though this would require extensive relationship building with national governments and the international community.

3. PART II – ROUND TABLE: STAY ENGAGED BUT DIFFERENTLY? REMAINING CHALLENGES FOR PEACEBUILDING AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

3.1 Did Busan live up to the recommendations of the World Development Report 2011?

Presentation by Phil Vernon, International Alert

Phil Vernon described the Busan Summit as representing a discourse of opportunity on the one hand and a formal agreement on the other. This discourse is marked by the realisation that the process of peacebuilding and statebuilding entails moving along the continuum from fragility to resilience – a political development process in which peace and accountability are crucial. Importantly, the BRIC states are also involved in this discourse. While this context seems quite promising, the problem is, ultimately, how to turn this opportunity into successful action.

Vernon proposed a set of four criteria by which to judge the Busan outcome as far as conflict-affected and fragile countries are concerned. Success would be measurable by the degree to which participants:

1. Recognise how little is really known about how aid can promote and foster the emergence of better governed societies in fragile contexts.
2. Disagree on the best way forward, and thus retain the good ideas around which there is no consensus, instead of marginalising creativity in the search for what everyone can agree on.
3. Decide to stop holding forums on aid effectiveness, and instead begin a discussion about what effective development – human progress – looks like; and linked this to the process of replacing the MDGs with more appropriate measures of progress, and with the need for governments and others to change their behaviours outside the narrow realm of aid.
4. Are committed to operationalising some of the exciting new ideas in development, such as building more peaceful and better governed societies, if necessary changing the architecture and mandate of aid and development institutions.

Overall, the Busan Summit demonstrated considerable political will, but ultimately there was not much progress on the practical level. It would be a mistake to use individual programmes as pilots for some global agenda. There is an urgent need to learn from the MDGs and move beyond global indicators.

3.2 Effectiveness in Conflict? Which relevance, which risks, which choices?

Presentation by Christine Toetzke, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)

Christine Toetzke pointed out that the process that led to the New Deal at the Busan Summit evolved quite quickly. In this process the *WDR 2011: Conflict, Security, and*

Links & Literature

[The New Deal: How do we reach Paris from here?](#)

Phil Vernon | 2012

Development became very influential. In light of the resulting New Deal it became crucial that appropriate fragility indicators be identified in an inclusive process in order to secure their legitimacy. While g7+ countries protested that the 10 OECD DAC Principles had never been discussed with them, indicators set up by fragile states were not ideal either.

With regard to effectiveness, Toetzke pointed out that development processes take a long time and that external influence is limited. Moreover, donor countries (including the public) are rather reluctant to commit to international development in the face of domestic financial crises. German aid to fragile states (according to the DAC fragility listing) is concentrated on eight states. In this context, sound joint actor analysis is essential for cooperation and the New Deal’s emphasis on cooperation between states and civil society actors should be seen as a positive development. In conclusion, Toetzke urged civil society actors to contribute to the debate by disseminating information.

3.3 Whose Ownership? The Recipients’ Views on Aid Effectiveness and Conflict

Presentation by Dayna Brown, CDA Listening Project

Dayna Brown presented results from the CDA Listening Project, which interviewed over 6000 people in 20 countries. Despite living in very different contexts, all had very similar experiences with aid and development assistance, the structures and systems of which generally remain uniform. The Listening Project is aimed at informing the debate on development assistance using the feedback from aid recipients about their experiences with peacebuilding and donors. Some of the key findings are that:

1. Awareness of whose interests are prioritised is vital;
2. Prepackaged solutions can be problematic. Aid must support ground-level solutions;
3. Spending quickly can do harm; don’t rush;
4. Aid is politicised locally and therefore not neutral; aid should be fair and equitable;
5. Context analysis is still weak. “One country, one plan, one vision” can be problematic and cater to power-holders.

Links & Literature

[How to Make Aid More Effective for People Affected by Conflict and Fragility](#)
Policy Brief | CDA Listening Project | 2011

In order to address these issues, it is necessary to:

- Engage a broad range of people with different perspectives;
- Provide aid to all who need it;
- Address the drivers of conflict even where these are political in nature (this requires political will);
- Link conflict analysis and poverty analysis; think long-term;
- Engage in dialogue.

3.4 Increasing the Effectiveness of Civil Society as Peace- and Statebuilders

Presentation by Dr Wolfgang Heinrich, Church Development Service (EED)

Focusing on the partner organisations' perspective, **Wolfgang Heinrich** emphasised that civil society organisations often have bad experiences with governments in fragile states, making cooperation difficult and relationship building essential. In this context, international actors must not only be extremely patient, but also consistently reliable. Furthermore, the "one vision, one strategy" approach is largely unrealistic and contains the danger of blueprinting solutions. Instead, the international community should pursue methods and strategies that are flexible, context specific, and able to accommodate dissent. In the face of the recent decline in the role of civil society (as in the case of the Ethiopian NGO legislation), there is an international responsibility to implement the independence of civil society organisations. One crucial lesson learned is that donors need to be more flexible even if actors cannot guarantee outcomes.

Links & Literature

[Civil Society, Aid Effectiveness and Enabling Environment](#)
Political Space of Civil Society Organisations in Africa: The Cases of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Zambia
EED | 2011

Discussion

Further points raised by participants in the following discussion:

- The New Deal is essentially a political document and the political content must be a priority in pilot countries where day-to-day power politics must be dealt with;
- There is very little accountability in the field of international development assistance because failure has few consequences. The incentive structures for the private sector, which is becoming more salient, are entirely different and should be learned from, especially as regards risk management systems that accommodate failure;
- It is difficult to persuade parliamentarians in donor countries that international development takes longer than their respective legislative periods and that some failures are inevitable;
- The challenge is to move away from a situation of fragility by helping societies develop institutions that can be resilient in the face of crisis.
- The New Deal represents an opportunity for increased constructive dialogue on the basis of which the transition from fragility to agility can be made.

4. CONCLUSION

Andreas Wittkowsky highlighted three points on which there was consensus among participants:

1. The main innovation of the New Deal is the ownership of the process by the fragile states themselves (though there are some caveats to this).
2. It is important to recognise that although the New Deal is primarily a process between donors and the governments of fragile states, it provides a sound commitment to inclusive processes involving the whole of society.

3. Key operational questions include the joint development of indicators, delivery modes, and the involvement of local civil society organisations in the selected pilot countries.

In conclusion, Wittkowsky emphasised the opportunities of the New Deal, namely

1. **operational aspects**, such as the development of appropriate success and performance indicators, as well as the design of the further process and delivery modes;
2. **political clout**, in providing a framework to secure the space for civil society activities.

Participants were encouraged to discuss in their institutions the forms and means of engagement by which they could potentially support their respective partners in fragile states in implementing the New Deal. FriEnt would be very willing to act as a facilitator for any follow-up events.

5. ANNEX

5.1 Programme

- 10:30 **Registration and Coffee**
- 11:00 **Welcome and Introduction**
 Marc Baxmann/Andreas Wittkowsky, FriEnt

- 11:15 **Part I – Debriefing on the Busan Summit**
 (Facilitation: Marc Baxmann, FriEnt)

- Lead questions:
- What commitments have been made on peacebuilding in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation?
 - What is new in the “New Deal” and how to implement its commitments?
 - Which relevance and which conclusions for governmental and civil society organisations in Europe?

**A New Deal for Aid Effectiveness, Conflict and Fragility?
 Topics, Elaborations and Conclusions of Busan**
 Fernanda Faria, Programme Associate, European Center for
 Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht

The “New Deal” from a Civil Society Perspective
 Koenraad van Brabant, Interpeace, Geneva

Discussion

- 13:00 Lunch

- 14:00-16:30 **Part II – Round Table: Stay engaged but differently? Remaining
 Challenges for Peacebuilding and Aid Effectiveness**
 (Facilitation: Andreas Wittkowsky, FriEnt)

- Lead questions:
- “Results” in fragile states – Which goals, which indicators, which timeframes? How to ensure that aid is effective?
 - With whom to “align”? – How to ensure that aid is designed primarily to meet the needs of people living in conflict affected contexts?
 - Whose “ownership”? – Using conditionality or incentives to promote inclusive and participatory processes in-country?

- “Inclusiveness” – How to create one vision, one strategy, and legitimate state-society relations?

Did Busan live up to the recommendations of the World Development Report 2011?

Phil Vernon, International Alert, London

Effectiveness in Conflict? Which Relevance, which Risks, which Choices?

Christine Toetzke, Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ), Berlin

Whose ownership? The Recipients’ Views on Aid Effectiveness and Conflict

Dayna Brown, CDA Listening Project, Cambridge (MA)

Increasing the Effectiveness of Civil Society as Peace- and Statebuilders

Wolfgang Heinrich, Church Development Service (EED), Bonn

16:30

Conclusion

5.2 Speakers

Dayna Brown

Director of The Listening Project at CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

The Listening Project aims to understand the cumulative effects of international assistance by listening to those who have been on the receiving end of these efforts. Prior to joining CDA in 2006, Dayna Brown worked for Mercy Corps as a Senior Program Officer for Civil Society and Conflict Management in Washington DC and in program management in Indonesia and Kosovo. In 1998-99, she served as a Humanitarian Affairs Liaison with the US Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission and with USAID/OTI in Kosovo and Macedonia.

Dayna Brown began her career in international development as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Kenya from 1992-94 and then worked with Habitat for Humanity in Kenya and Tanzania. She received a Master of Arts degree in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School at Tufts University in 1998, and has a Bachelor's of Business Administration from Texas Christian University.

Fernanda Faria

Associate Consultant, ECDPM / Associate Researcher, IEEI

Fernanda Faria is an independent consultant working mainly on issues related to peacebuilding and statebuilding policies in fragile states, including security and development policy responses, particularly in the context of EU-Africa relations. She has conducted field work, policy analysis, and consultation processes on these themes, namely for the EU and OECD in central African states and Guinea-Bissau.

She co-authored a study for the 2007 Portuguese Presidency of the EU entitled [Situations of fragility: challenges for a European response strategy](#) and has written about the role of the EU in crisis management in Africa. Faria is programme associate at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht and associate researcher at the Institute for Security and International Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon. She worked, as a consultant, in country consultations for the monitoring of the Fragile States Principles and Paris Declaration, and for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

**Wolfgang Heinrich, Church Development Service (EED)
Head of Desk for Peace and Conflict Management Issues (AsFK)**

Since 2002, Wolfgang Heinrich, PhD, is heading the Desk for Peace and Conflict Management Issues (AsFK) of the Churches' Development Service (Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, EED). He represents EED in the Board of the Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt).

A social anthropologist by education, Wolfgang Heinrich has been working for European non-governmental development organisations for the past 25 years. For the most part he has been working in and on countries in situations of violent conflict, e.g. in the Horn of Africa and in South Asia. In quite practical terms this brought him to revisit the topic of his PhD thesis, which looked at the challenges of ethnic identity and state building from an academic perspective.

**Christine Toetzke, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Head of Division „Peace and Security“**

Since 1992, Christine Toetzke held several posts within BMZ, including emergency aid, cooperation with the European Union, and Human Resources. In 1997-98 she worked in Germany's Permanent Representation at the EU at Brussels. In 2004, she became the Head of Division „Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention“. Following a two-years-stay in Washington DC, she has served as the Head of Division „Peace and Security“ since September 2008.

Christine Toetzke holds a diploma in economics from the University of Cologne and completed the post-graduate course at the German Development Institute (DIE).

**Koenraad van Brabant, Interpeace
Head of Reflective Practice and Learning**

Koenraad van Brabant has worked for Interpeace for the past 8 years and is involved in research, training and mentoring, policy work and evaluation. As of November 2011 he works with Interpeace half-time, with the other half-time available again for consulting work. Three of his most significant engagements in 2011 have been as co-designer and co-director of a course on 'Leadership for Peacebuilding' that Interpeace and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy organise annually; sharing experience and expertise on 'dialogue-oriented programmes' with the Commissioners of the newly appointed Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation in Ivory Coast; and as a coordinator and leading voice for the civil society engagement with the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, for which Interpeace provided the platform.

Following initial studies in art history and archeology, Koenraad van Brabant continued his studies in the USA, Spain and Switzerland in anthropology and development. This was followed by extensive real-world practical learning through now over twenty years of working in and on conflict, including 15 years in humanitarian action, of which about half full-time in conflict-affected areas, complemented by 4 years as a Research Fellow in the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute in London.

**Phil Vernon, International Alert
Director of Programmes (Africa and Peacebuilding Issues)**

Phil Vernon provides leadership and oversight of Alert’s programmes in West Africa and the Great Lakes region, and of the Peacebuilding Issues Programme, which deals with cross-cutting issues of importance to peacebuilding, such as the economy, gender, and security, as well as Alert’s core learning and training functions. He also leads Alert’s advocacy on aid effectiveness, and in 2010 was the principal author of [Working with the grain to change the grain: Moving beyond the MDGs](#), which called for a radical overhaul of the international aid system.

He joined Alert in September 2004, prior to which he had worked in development, humanitarian and peacebuilding in Africa since 1985, working specifically in Sudan, Rwanda, Lesotho, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Togo and Uganda. Initially a forester by training, with an MSc from the University of North Wales, his interest in conflict and peacebuilding was stimulated by the experience of living in Rwanda from 1992-94. From 2000-04 he was country director of CARE Uganda, and played an active role in research and advocacy on the Northern Uganda conflict, helping to establish and lead the Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda coalition. He is also a member of the Forum on Corporate Responsibility of mining company BHP Billiton, and a trustee of UK-based development NGO BuildAfrica. Phil blogs on Peacebuilding and Development issues at www.philvernon.net

5.3 List of Participants

John Akude	German Development Institute (DIE)
Frederike Aumann	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)
Sebastien Babaud	Saferworld
Marc Baxmann	Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt)
Matthias Berthold	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Dayna Brown	CDA Listening Project
Cornelia Brinkmann	Steps for Peace
Sarah Degen-Heinemann	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Fernanda Faria	European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Ekkehard Forberg	World Vision
Claudia Frank	Groupe Tchad
Sebastian Fuchs	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)

Simone Görtz	European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Johannes Hamacher	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Wibke Hansen	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Wolfgang Heinrich	Church Development Service (EED)
Stephan Huppertz	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Anja Justen	Civil Peace Service Group/FriEnt
Martin Kipping	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Kathrin Lorenz	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Antje Lüdemann-Dundus	World Vision
Christine Meissler	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)/FriEnt
David Newton	Conciliation Resources
Birgit Pech	Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)
Tobias Pietz	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Carla Schraml	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Sylvia Servaes	Misereor/FriEnt
Angelika Spelten	Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management/FriEnt
Antonia Tilly	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Christine Toetzke	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Koenraad van Brabant	Interpeace
Phil Vernon	International Alert
Rainer Venghaus	The World Bank
Leopold von Carlowitz	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Hendrik Wantia	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher	German Development Institute (DIE)